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Abstract 
In three experiments, we investigated whether the feedback effect on the accuracy of 
children’s metacognitive judgments results from an improvement in monitoring processes or 
the use of the Anchoring-and-Adjustment heuristic. Experiment 1 revealed that adding 
feedback increased the accuracy of young children’s (aged 4, 6, and 8 years) memory 
prediction. In Experiment 2, the influence of an external anchor on children’s metacognitive 
judgment was established. Finally, in Experiment 3, two memory tasks that differed in terms of 
difficulty were administered. Participants were randomly assigned to an anchoring 
(high/low/no anchor) and a feedback (feedback/no feedback) condition. Results demonstrated 
that children in the feedback condition adjusted their predictions toward the feedback, 
regardless of the task’s difficulty. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that 
external information provided by feedback is used as an anchor for judgment. This 
interpretation is strengthened by the correlation found between the two scores computed to 
assess participants’ susceptibility to anchoring and feedback effects, which indicates that 
children who are more sensitive to the anchoring effect are also more sensitive to the feedback 
effect. 
 
Keywords: Metacognition, Judgment, Feedback, Anchoring, Children
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The Effect of Feedback on Children’s Metacognitive Judgments:  
A Heuristic Account 
Decades of intensive studies on metacognition have established that how accurately 
people assess their memory determines how efficiently they regulate their learning (Dunlosky 
& Hertzog, 1998; Kornell & Bjork, 2007; Kornell & Metcalfe, 2006; T. O. Nelson & Narens, 1994; 
Son, 2010; Thiede, 1996). Usually, the ability to assess internal cognitive processes (i.e., 
metacognitive monitoring) is appraised by asking participants to judge the quality of their 
performance before (prospective judgment) or after (retrospective judgment) carrying out a 
cognitive task. These metacognitive judgments can be made on an item-by-item basis (local 
level) or for the task as a whole (global level). The accuracy of judgments can be assessed with 
calibration scores (Van Overschelde & Nelson, 2006). This type of score shows the degree to 
which the judgment differs from the actual level of performance. 
Children’s metacognitive judgments are far from accurate. Many developmental studies 
have demonstrated that children regularly overestimate their memory performance when 
making metacognitive judgments (e.g., Kvavilashvili & Ford, 2014; Lipko, Dunlosky, Lipowski, & 
Merriman, 2012). Interestingly, this effect seems to be particularly pronounced when the 
accuracy of global prospective judgments is examined (Lipko, Dunlosky, & Merriman, 2009; 
Shin, Bjorklund, & Beck, 2007; Yussen & Levy, 1975). For instance, Shin et al. (2007) presented 
three groups of children (aged 6, 7, and 9 years old) with a set of pictures, then asked them to 
estimate how many items they thought they would be able to remember on a subsequent test 
(global prospective judgment). The results revealed that more than 75% of the 6- and 7-year-
old children overestimated the number of pictures they would recall. Moreover, at 9 years of 
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age, almost 50% of children still overestimated their memory performance. Given the amount 
of new learning that children have to master each day and the well-established influence of 
accurate monitoring processes on cognitive and academic performance (Everson & Tobias, 
1998; Pintrich & de Groot, 1990; Roebers, Schmid, & Roderer, 2009), research on 
metacognition has long focused on identifying methods and situations that could improve 
children’s monitoring abilities (e.g., Koriat, Goldsmith, Schneider, & Nakash-Dura, 2001). 
A procedure that has been assumed to increase the accuracy of both adults’ and 
children’s monitoring processes involves providing external feedback to draw participants’ 
attention to the fact that their performance was evaluated as poor (Butler, Karpicke, & 
Roediger, 2008; Efklides & Dina, 2004; Kornell & Rhodes, 2013; Metcalfe & Finn, 2011, 2012; 
Miller & Geraci, 2011; Roll, Aleven, McLaren, & Koedinger, 2011). Nevertheless, although the 
positive influence of external feedback on adults’ (Metcalfe & Finn, 2011) and older children’s 
(Metcalfe & Finn, 2012) metacognitive judgments seems to be well established, to our 
knowledge, this effect has never been studied in participants under the age of 8 years. Yet, 
according to the literature, young children tend to have the highest level of metacognitive 
overestimation; thus, they are certainly in the greatest need of corrective feedback to improve 
the accuracy of their predictions (Lipko et al., 2009; Shin et al., 2007; Yussen & Levy, 1975). 
For these reasons, the first aim of the present study is to investigate whether young 
children are able to make more accurate global prospective judgments after receiving concrete 
feedback about their previous metacognitive predictions (Experiment 1). According to Koriat 
(2007), participants may not always rely on effortful monitoring processes to make their 
judgments; they may also base their decisions on various metacognitive heuristics (i.e., 
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automatic inference rules that are used to guide memory decisions on the basis of a variety of 
cues. These rule are supposed to operate at the fringe of consciousness; Reber, Schwarz, & 
Winkielman, 2004). For instance, Koriat, Ackerman, Lockl, and Schneider (2009a, 2009b) have 
shown that 9-year-old children’s metacognitive judgments are based on the automatic 
inference that easily learned items are more likely to be remembered (i.e., memorizing-effort 
heuristic), suggesting that metacognitive heuristics can be used by children to evaluate their 
own learning. Although Koriat and colleagues did not detect any use of this heuristic in younger 
children, studies have recently indicated that children could already rely on this automatic 
inference rule as early as 4 (Geurten, Willems, & Meulemans, 2015). We therefore postulated 
that the Anchoring-and-Adjustment heuristic could potentially account for the effect of 
feedback on metacognitive judgments. 
The anchoring effect is defined as the adjustment – higher or lower – of the estimation 
of an unknown quantity, based upon previously presented external information, namely the 
anchor (e.g., Epley & Gilovich, 2006; McElroy & Dowd, 2007; Simmons, LeBoeuf, & Nelson, 
2010; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Tversky and Kahneman (1974) were the first to demonstrate 
the influence of the anchoring effect on people’s judgments. In their classic study, they found 
that adults generally estimated that a greater percentage of African countries belong to the 
United Nations after being exposed to an external anchor of 65% than after being exposed to 
an external anchor of 10%. Over time, the Anchoring-and-Adjustment heuristic has been 
claimed to be involved in a wide range of numerical judgments (Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 
2006; Northcraft & Neale, 1987; Switzer & Sniezek, 1991; Wright & Anderson, 1989), including 
the appraisal of future memory performance (Scheck & Nelson, 2005). To date, however, the 
Running head: Feedback effect in children 6 
ability to rely on the heuristic to guide judgments has not been studied in children under the 
age of 9 years (Smith, 1999). A second experiment was therefore conducted to explore whether 
young children (aged 4, 6, and 8 years old) adjust their metacognitive judgments upward or 
downward after being randomly presented with a high or low anchor (Experiment 2). 
Specifically, in our second experiment, children were asked whether they thought they would 
remember more or fewer than 12 words (high anchor) or more or fewer than 2 words (low 
anchor). If children make their memory decisions on the basis of the Anchoring-and-Adjustment 
heuristic, we expect them to predict that they will be able to recall more words when a high 
anchor is provided than when no anchor is given. Conversely, we expect them to predict that 
they will be able to recall fewer words when a low anchor is provided than when no anchor is 
given. 
Finally, we examine whether the influence of feedback on metacognitive judgment is 
due to an anchoring effect. To this end, a third experiment was carried out in which two 
memory tasks were administered to children. Half of the participants received feedback about 
the accuracy of their judgment after the first task. This time, however, we adopted a procedure 
that was anticipated to lead to different results depending on whether feedback induced 
children to engage in effortful metacognitive processes or whether it was used as a cue for 
automatic inference. Specifically, we presented children with two tasks that varied in terms of 
their level of difficulty (easy or hard). The rationale for this choice was that participants’ 
performance was supposed to vary as a function of task difficulty. Consequently, feedback on 
the number of items recalled during the first task was not an appropriate cue to predict 
performance on the second task. If the feedback effect results from the implementation of the 
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Anchoring-and-Adjustment heuristic, then participants are expected to adjust their global 
prediction based on the feedback they are given, regardless of differences in task difficulty. 
Indeed, if an easy task is administered first, children will perform well and, thus, will receive 
positive feedback (high anchor). According to the anchoring hypothesis, we expect participants 
to predict that they will perform better on the second (hard) task than children who receive no 
feedback. Similarly, if a hard task is given first, children will perform poorly and, thus, will 
receive negative feedback (low anchor). If feedback is used as an anchor, we anticipate 
participants to predict that they will remember fewer items for the second (easy) task than 
children in the no feedback condition. Conversely, if the effect of feedback is to draw children’s 
attention to the fact that they had evaluated their memory poorly, participants in the feedback 
condition are expected to take the difficulty of the task into account when making a subsequent 
judgment, resulting in more accurate judgments for children in the feedback condition than for 
children in the no feedback condition. 
To sum up, the main goals of this study are to (a) determine whether getting feedback 
about the accuracy of the metacognitive judgment allows young children to better predict their 
future memory performance; (b) examine whether preschool and early school-aged children 
rely on the Anchoring-and-Adjustment heuristic to guide their memory decisions; and (c) 
explore whether the processes underlying the effect of feedback on children’s metacognitive 
judgments results from an anchoring effect (where feedback serves as an external anchor). 
Experiment 1 
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to investigate whether 4-, 6-, and 8-year-old children 
are able to use feedback to increase the accuracy of their memory judgments. To do so, 
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children in three age groups were divided into two experimental conditions (feedback or no 
feedback). After studying a list of associated words, participants were instructed to predict their 
future memory performance, and then they were asked to recall as many items as possible. 
Next, half of the participants were given concrete feedback about the accuracy of their global 
prediction. Once the feedback was provided, all children were presented with another set of 
associated word pairs and the procedure was repeated. We expected children in the feedback 
condition to make more accurate prospective judgments than children in the no feedback 
condition, regardless of their age. This pattern would demonstrate young children’s 
susceptibility to feedback effects. From a developmental point of view, the changes in this 
feedback effect across age groups were also examined. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 48 typically developing children aged 4 (n = 16; Mean = 
52.99 months, SD = 5.41), 6 (n = 16; Mean = 76.20 months, SD = 5.37), and 8 (n = 16; Mean = 
101.40 months, SD = 3.45) years old. The proportion of girls and boys was strictly equivalent in 
each group. The mean of both parents’ years of education was used to appraise socioeconomic 
status (Mean = 13.78, SD = 2.03), and standard scores on the Matrix subtest of the Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-IV; Wechsler, 2005) and the Wechsler Preschool and 
Primary Scale of Intelligence (WPPSI-III; Wechsler, 2004) were used to evaluate nonverbal 
intelligence (Mean = 10.31, SD = 2.66). No group difference was found between the three age 
groups for socioeconomic status and nonverbal intelligence, Fs<1, ps>.52. The sample was 
recruited from French-speaking kindergartens and elementary schools in the province of Liège, 
Belgium. 
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Materials. Stimuli consisted of 30 pairs of words (cue-target). All cues and targets were 
French nouns between three and nine letters in length (Mean = 5.47) and with one to three 
syllables (Mean = 1.73). Each word selected was expected to be included in the vocabulary of 4-
year-old children. The pairs were matched so that no easy semantic or phonological association 
could be made between the two items in a given pair (e.g., Cloud-Key). Half of the 30 pairs were 
randomly assigned to one of the two experimental lists. The two sets of items were equal in 
terms of word frequency (10.7 and 9.1 occurrences per million words; Radeau, Mousty, & 
Content, 1990), length (a mean of 5.33 and 5.60 letters per word), and number of syllables (a 
mean of 1.66 and 1.8 syllables). A pretest carried out on 15 participants (aged 4, 6, and 8 years 
old) indicated that the two lists were equal in terms of the number of words that children were 
able to recall after one trial in a cued-recall task. 
Procedure and design. The study was approved by the local ethics committee. Written 
consent was obtained from the parents before the study began. Children were tested 
individually in a quiet room in their school. Each child underwent a 45-minute session during 
which the two verbal memory tasks were administered. The order of these tasks was 
counterbalanced between subjects. All participants were informed that they would have to 
study 15 cue-target pairs, make a global prospective judgment and take a cued-recall test; this 
procedure would take place twice. The study and recall phases of each task were separated by 
a 10-minute delay that was filled with two nonverbal cognitive tasks. One of these tasks was 
the Matrix test. Figure 1 illustrates the procedure of Experiments 1 to 3. 
A 3 (Age Group: 4-, 6-, or 8-year-olds) x 2 (Condition: feedback or no feedback) 
between-subjects design was used in Experiment 1. There were 8 children per cell. 
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Study phase. A list of 15 word pairs was presented twice in random order to each child. 
Participants were asked to try to remember as many pairs as possible so they would be able to 
recall as many targets as possible when the associated cues were presented later. More 
specifically, participants were asked to stare at a fixation cross (+) in the center of the screen 
while the two items were named by a female voice (over the computer speakers) at a rate of 
one every 4 s. Because the children in the two younger groups were not able to read, we chose 
not to accompany the auditory presentation of the words with a visual one (i.e., written words) 
to avoid favoring the older children. Once every pair had been given, the items were presented 
for re-study. This procedure was chosen because a pretest indicated that most 4-year-old 
children were not able to recall more than one target after a single presentation of the pairs. 
Judgment phase. The study phase was immediately followed by a metacognitive 
judgment solicitation. Specifically, children were asked to estimate how many of the 15 targets 
they thought they would remember in response to the presentation of the cue in an upcoming 
test (i.e., global prospective judgment). 
Recall phase. A 10-minute delay followed the judgment phase. Once this time had 
elapsed, there was a final cued-recall test. The task was to recall the second word of each pair 
in response to the presentation of the first one. There was no time limit to complete the task. 
At the end of the test, half of the participants were given concrete feedback regarding their 
prospective judgment (feedback condition). Specifically, children were first reminded of their 
metacognitive prediction regarding their memory performance (e.g., “A bit earlier, you said you 
would recall 9 items out of the 15 you studied”). Then they were told the number of pairs they 
were actually able to remember (e.g., “In fact, you recalled 6 words”). No metacognitive 
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feedback was provided to the other half of the sample (no feedback condition). The procedure 
described above was repeated for the second memory test (see Figure 1). 
< Figure 1 about here > 
Measures. For each of the two memory tasks, the recorded measures were (a) the 
number of correct responses for the cued-recall test (memory score); (b) the number of items 
predicted during the judgment phase (judgment score); and (c) the accuracy of children’s 
predictions compared with their actual memory performance (calibration score). The latter 
score was computed using a formula adapted from the one developed by Hacker, Bol, and 
Bahbahani (2008). Using this equation, a score of 0 indicates perfect accuracy, a negative score 
indicates that children underestimated their memory performance, and a positive score 









Data analyses. A 3 (Age Group: 4-, 6-, or 8-year-olds) × 2 (Condition: feedback or no 
feedback) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to investigate the 
effect of metacognitive feedback on children’s memory predictions. As the feedback effect 
could not logically be observed on the memory task that was presented first, statistical analyses 
were only carried out on the scores for the second memory task (i.e., the task performed after 
the feedback was given). Moreover, to ensure that the difference observed between the 
feedback and no feedback conditions for the second memory task was not due to initial 
differences in participants’ cognitive and metacognitive abilities, the memory, judgment, and 
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calibration scores recorded during the first task were included as covariates in the analyses 
carried out on the memory, judgment, and calibration scores, respectively, recorded for the 
second task. The significance level was set at .05. Statistical analyses indicated homogeneity of 
variance between age groups and feedback conditions, and revealed no gender or order effect 
on any of the dependent variables. Table 1 displays the mean number of correct responses, as 
well as the number of items predicted and the accuracy of predictions for each experimental 
condition (feedback/no feedback). 
Memory score. We first examined whether the feedback condition affected children’s 
memory performance. The results of an ANCOVA revealed a main effect of age, F(2,42) = 4.71, 
MSe = 2.00, p = .01, η²p = .19, on the number of targets recalled, indicating that older children 
had better memory performance than younger children. However, no other effect reached 
significance, Fs<1.60, ps>.21. 
Judgment score. The effect of feedback on children’s global memory prediction was 
analyzed. No age effect or age x condition interaction was found, Fs<1, ps>.77. However, the 
results revealed a main effect of condition, F(1,42) = 8.75, MSe = 5.89, p = .005, η²p = .18, 
indicating that children’s predictions were lower in the feedback (Mean = 5.88) than in the no 
feedback condition (Mean = 7.95). The effect of the covariate (judgment score for the first task) 
was also significant, F(1,42) = 26.96, MSe = 5.89, p < .001, η²p = .40. 
< Table 1 about here > 
Calibration score. Finally, the effect of feedback condition and children’s age on the 
accuracy of participants’ memory prediction was examined. The results of the ANCOVA 
revealed that children in the feedback condition showed greater metacognitive calibration than 
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children in the no feedback condition, F(1,42) = 10.23, MSe = 0.04, p = .003, η²p = .20. An effect 
of the covariate (calibration score for the first task) was also found, F(1,42) = 19.40, MSe = 0.04, 
p < .001, η²p = .33. No age effect or age x condition effect was found, Fs<1, ps>.56. On the 
whole, these results seem to suggest that all children were able to use the feedback to improve 
the accuracy of their future metacognitive judgments. 
Discussion 
The main goal of Experiment 1 was to demonstrate the effect of feedback on young 
children’s metacognitive judgments. Our results revealed that children’s predictions were more 
accurate in the feedback than in the no feedback condition, indicating that getting feedback 
about the accuracy of their judgments had a positive influence on their subsequent memory 
predictions. Moreover, in this experiment, most of the participants (95.9%) overestimated their 
future memory performance. Therefore, children in the feedback condition generally received 
negative feedback about their predictions. This could have affected their motivation to do the 
task and could therefore have reduced their memory performance (for a meta-analysis 
investigating the effect of negative feedback on cognitive performance, see Kluger & DeNisi, 
1996). However, although the feedback was shown to affect the metacognitive scores (i.e., 
prediction and calibration scores) by inducing participants to revise their judgment downward 
to match their recent memory performance, no effect was observed on objective memory 
performance. 
From a developmental perspective, the results showed that the calibration of global 
prospective judgments improves with age (Shin et al., 2007). Regarding the feedback effect, 
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however, our findings revealed that all children – whatever their age – were sensitive to the 
influence of feedback in the same way. 
As the sensitivity of young children to feedback was now established, we examined the 
nature of the processes underlying this feedback effect. According to the literature, automatic 
decision rules have been demonstrated to be involved in people’s judgments (for an overview, 
see Koriat, 2007). One of these automatic rules, the Anchoring-and-Adjustment heuristic, 
seems to be frequently used when numerical judgments are required (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). However, to our knowledge, the involvement of this heuristic in preschoolers’ and early 
school-aged children’s memory judgments has never been studied. Experiment 2 was therefore 
carried out to examine young children’s ability to base their prospective judgments on an 
external anchor. Once the anchoring effect was demonstrated, a third experiment was 
conducted to test whether the anchoring effect accounted for the influence of feedback on 
memory predictions. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we sought to determine whether young children are able to use the 
Anchoring-and-Adjustment heuristic to guide their global memory predictions. For this purpose, 
4-, 6-, and 8-year-old children were divided into three experimental conditions depending on 
the anchor that was provided (high, low, or no anchor). We predicted that children would 
adjust their prospective judgments in the direction of the anchor they were given, 
demonstrating their susceptibility to anchoring effects. Furthermore, the developmental trend 
of children’s ability to rely on the heuristic was also explored. 
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Method 
Participants. A total of 45 typically developing unilingual children aged 4 (Mean = 55.07 
months, SD = 2.88, n = 15, 8 females), 6 (Mean = 82.59 months, SD = 2.98, n = 15, 8 females), 
and 8 (Mean = 103.97 months, SD = 3.08, n = 15, 7 females) years old participated in 
Experiment 2. No group difference was found in terms of parental education level and 
nonverbal intelligence, Fs<1.50, ps>.23. 
Materials. A list of 15 unrelated pairs of French words (cue-target) was used in 
Experiment 2. This list was one of the two used in Experiment 1. 
Procedure and design. Each participant underwent a 30-minute session. In Experiment 
2, only one memory task was administered (see Figure 1). Once again, the study and recall 
phases were separated by a 10-minute delay that was filled with two nonverbal cognitive tasks, 
including the Matrix test. The procedure was identical to the one described in Experiment 1 
except for the judgment phase. In that phase, participants were divided into three experimental 
conditions: high, low, or no anchor. In the high anchor condition, children were asked to say 
whether they thought they would remember more or fewer than 12 targets; this initial 
information was used as the anchor. After that, participants were asked to estimate the exact 
number of items they thought they would remember. The same procedure was employed in 
the low anchor condition, except that children were first asked whether they thought they 
would be able to recall more or fewer than 2 targets. In the no anchor condition, children were 
simply instructed to estimate the number of targets they would be able to recall in the 
upcoming cued-recall test. Thus, a 3 (Age Group: 4-, 6-, or 8-year-olds) x 3 (Condition: high, low, 
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or no anchor) between-subjects design was used in Experiment 2. There were 5 children per 
cell. 
Measures. The key analyses conducted in Experiment 2 focused on (a) the number of 
correct responses for the cued-recall test (memory score); (b) the number of items predicted 
(judgment score); and (c) the accuracy of children’s predictions compared with their actual 
memory performance, assessed using the same formula as in Experiment 1 (calibration score). 
Results 
Data analyses. For each dependent variable, a 3 (Age Group: 4-, 6-, or 8-year-olds) × 3 
(Condition: high, low, or no anchor) between-subjects ANOVA was carried out to explore 
whether young children adjusted their prospective judgments upward or downward because of 
an anchor, demonstrating their ability to rely on the Anchoring-and-Adjustment heuristic. 
Preliminary analyses indicated homogeneity of variance between age groups and experimental 
conditions. No gender effect was revealed on any of the dependent variables. Table 2 displays 
the mean number of correct responses, as well as the number of items predicted and the 
calibration of predictions in each experimental condition (high, low, or no anchor). 
Memory score. As in Experiment 1, we first investigated the influence of age and 
experimental condition on participants’ memory performance. The results of the two-way 
ANOVA showed a main effect of age, F(2,40) = 8.54, MSE = 3.58, p < .001, η²p = .32, with older 
children obtaining higher memory scores than younger participants. However, no effect of 
anchoring condition and no age x condition interaction was found, Fs<1.40, ps>.26. 
Judgment score. Examination of the effect of age and anchoring condition on children’s 
global prospective judgment revealed a main effect of experimental condition, F(2,40) = 7.03, 
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MSe = 7.00, p = .003, η²p = .28. Linear contrast analyses indicated that children in the low 
anchor condition predicted that they would remember fewer targets (Mean = 5.27) than 
children in the high (Mean = 8.93) and no anchor (Mean = 7.47) conditions, p ≤ .032. However, 
no statistically significant difference was found between the high anchor and no anchor 
conditions, p = .14. No other main effect or interaction of the two-way ANOVA reached 
significance, Fs<1, ps>.60. These findings suggest that the ability to rely on an anchor to make 
memory judgments is acquired early in childhood. 
< Table 2 about here > 
Calibration score. The results of the 3 (Age Group) x 3 (Condition) ANOVA revealed no 
interaction effect, F(2,40) = 0.73, MSe = 0.04. However, a main effect of age was found, F(2,40) 
= 5.17, MSe = 0.04, p = .01, η²p = .22, indicating that older children predicted their memory 
performance more accurately than younger children. A statistical trend toward an effect of the 
experiment condition was also found, F(2,40) = 2.75, MSe = 0.04, p = .08, η²p = .13. Linear 
contrast analyses revealed that children made a more calibrated judgment when a low anchor 
was provided (Mean = 0.11) than when a high anchor was provided (Mean = 0.28), p = .02. 
However, no difference was found in the no anchor condition, all ps>.20. This pattern of results 
is coherent with the finding that children generally overestimate their performance when 
making prospective judgments (Shin et al., 2007). Because providing a low anchor leads 
participants to revise their predictions downward, it results in more accurate judgments than 
when a high anchor is given. 
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Discussion 
The anchoring effect is frequently used to account for a wide variety of numerical 
judgments. However, to our knowledge, young children’s ability to use an external anchor to 
guide their decisions has never been studied. This experiment demonstrated that children’s 
predictions were higher in the high than in the low anchor condition, suggesting that children in 
all age groups adjusted their prospective judgment depending on the random anchor they were 
given. As children generally overestimate their memory performance when making a prediction 
(e.g., Shin et al., 2007), we are not surprised to observe a larger adjustment of the judgment in 
the low anchor condition than in the high anchor condition. Nevertheless, the latter finding 
indicates that the ability to rely on the Anchoring-and-Adjustment heuristic develops early. As 
young children’s ability to make memory predictions on the basis of an external anchor was 
now established, an additional experiment was carried out to examine the possible 
involvement of the Anchoring-and-Adjustment heuristic in the feedback effect. 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 1 confirmed that receiving feedback about the accuracy of a previous 
metacognitive judgment helps participants make a better memory prediction on a subsequent 
test. The primary focus of the present study was to determine what mechanisms underlie this 
feedback effect. Specifically, we postulate that the Anchoring-and-Adjustment heuristic could 
also account for the influence of feedback on memory prediction. In this context, the results of 
Experiment 2 demonstrating that young children are able to rely on an external anchor to guide 
their metacognitive judgment provide preliminary, but not sufficient, evidence for the latter 
hypothesis. 
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For these reasons, the primary aim of Experiment 3 was to determine whether the 
feedback effect can serve as an external anchor for children’s global prospective judgments 
(Scheck & Nelson, 2005). To do so, children were presented with two memory tasks that 
differed in terms of difficulty. Participants were randomly assigned to an anchoring (high, low, 
or no anchor) and a feedback (feedback or no feedback) condition to obtain a balanced 
experimental design. Assuming the anchoring hypothesis was correct, we anticipated that 
children would demonstrate less calibrated prospective judgment in the feedback than in the 
no feedback condition because they would adjust their global predictions in the direction of the 
feedback provided, regardless of the task’s difficulty (e.g., receiving positive feedback or a high 
anchor following an easy task would lead children to wrongly make a high prospective 
judgment for the hard subsequent task). Moreover, the relationship between participants’ 
vulnerability to anchoring effects and their vulnerability to feedback effects was also explored. 
The aim of the latter analysis was to show that children who adjusted their prediction toward 
the anchor in the first task were also more likely to adjust their prediction toward the feedback 
in the second task. Such a pattern would provide further evidence in favor of the anchoring 
hypothesis because it would indicate that the same processes influence children’s judgment 
when they are confronted with an anchor or with feedback. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 108 typically developing children aged 4 (n = 36; Mean = 
53.88 months, SD = 3.87), 6 (n = 36; Mean = 79.44 months, SD = 3.91), and 8 (n = 36; Mean = 
102.39 months, SD = 3.58) years old. Fifty percent of the subjects were girls. The groups were 
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roughly equivalent in terms of socioeconomic status (parental education level) and nonverbal 
intelligence (Matrix score), Fs<1, ps>.59. 
Materials. Two sets of 15 word pairs included in the vocabulary of 4-year-old children 
served as critical items. All cues and targets were French nouns between three and nine letters 
long (Mean = 5.45) and with one to three syllables (Mean = 1.65). Half of the pairs were created 
so that no easy semantic or phonological association could be found between the two items in 
a given pair (e.g., Cloud-Key). The remaining items were matched so that a quick semantic 
association could be made between the cue and the target (e.g., Day-Night). The procedure 
developed by D. Nelson, McEvoy, and Schreiber (2004) was used to determine the strength of 
the association between the two items in each pair. Ten related pairs and five unrelated pairs 
were included in the “easy” list. Ten unrelated pairs and five related pairs were included in the 
“hard” list. The two sets of items were equal in terms of word frequency (11.3 and 14.3 
occurrences per million words), length (a mean of 5.48 and 5.31 letters per word), and number 
of syllables (a mean of 1.65 and 1.72 syllables). The two lists of word pairs are presented in the 
Appendix. The results of a pretest indicated that children produced significantly more correct 
responses after studying the easy list (10 related pairs) than after studying the hard list (5 
related pairs), demonstrating that the former really was easier than the latter. 
Procedure and design. Each child participated in a 45-minute session. Participants were 
instructed that they would be asked to study 15 cue-target pairs, give a global prospective 
judgment and perform a cued-recall test; they would go through this procedure twice (see 
Figure 1). The procedure for the study and recall phases of the two memory tasks was identical 
to the one described in Experiment 1 (feedback procedure). The judgment phase for the first 
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set of pairs was the same as in Experiment 2 (anchoring procedure). However, the judgment 
phase for the second set of pairs was the same as in Experiment 1. We did not provide an 
anchor before the second prediction phase in order to examine the effect of feedback without 
interference. Specific instructions for each experimental condition are provided as 
supplemental material. The order of the two memory tasks (easy vs. hard) was counterbalanced 
between subjects. 
Thus, a 3 (Age Group: 4-, 6-, or 8-year-olds) x 3 (Anchoring: high, low, or no anchor) x 2 
(Feedback: feedback or no feedback) x 2 (Task Difficulty: easy or hard) mixed-subjects design 
was used in Experiment 3. Task difficulty was the only within-subject factor. Specifically, an easy 
task and a hard task were administered to all participants, but the order of these tasks was 
counterbalanced between subjects. Each child was randomly assigned to one of the anchoring 
and feedback conditions so as to obtain a balanced design. There were 6 children per cell. 
Measures. For each memory test, the main dependent variables included in our 
analyses were (a) the number of correct responses (memory score); (b) the number of items 
predicted (judgment score); and (c) the accuracy of children’s predictions as a function of their 
actual memory performance (calibration score). In addition, a score for susceptibility to 
anchoring effects was computed for the participants who received an anchor before making 
their prospective judgment. This score was computed using the measures recorded during the 
first memory task (i.e., the task for which an anchor was given). In the high anchor condition, 
the mean number of words predicted by children to whom no anchor was given (Mean = 4.71) 
was subtracted from the number of items predicted by each child. In the low anchor condition, 
the number of items predicted by each child was subtracted from the mean number of words 
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predicted by the children included in the no anchor condition. In this context, a positive score 
indicates that the children adjusted their prediction toward the anchor whether it was high or 
low. Finally, a score for susceptibility to feedback effects was calculated to determine the 
extent to which children adjusted their predictions after receiving feedback about the accuracy 
of their previous judgments. First, a discrepancy score between the number of items predicted 
for the first and second memory tasks was computed for each participant. Then the mean 
discrepancy score for children included in the no feedback condition (Mean = 2.25) was 
subtracted from the discrepancy score of each child in the feedback condition. A positive score 
indicated that participants adjusted their predictions more radically after receiving feedback 
than they did if no feedback was given. 
Results 
Data analyses. The primary aim of this third experiment was to determine whether 
feedback is used as a cue for the Anchoring-and-Adjustment heuristic (anchoring hypothesis). 
To examine the occurrence of an anchoring effect, a 3 (Age Group: 4-, 6-, or 8-year-olds) × 3 
(Anchoring: high, low, or no anchor) x 2 (Task Difficulty: easy or hard) mixed-subjects ANOVA 
was conducted on the number of correct responses, the number of items predicted, and the 
calibration of predictions for the first memory task. Task difficulty was the only within-subject 
factor. Because no anchor was provided before the second memory test, the anchoring effect 
was only investigated for the data recorded during the first memory test. 
Next, the feedback effect was investigated. For this purpose, a 3 (Age Group: 4-, 6-, or 8-
year-olds) × 2 (Feedback: feedback or no feedback) x 2 (Task Difficulty: easy or hard) ANCOVA 
was carried out on the number of correct responses, the number of items predicted, and the 
Running head: Feedback effect in children 23 
calibration of predictions for the second memory task. As in Experiment 1, the influence of 
memory, judgment, and calibration scores recorded during the first memory task was taken 
into account in the following analyses. A significant feedback x task difficulty interaction would 
indicate that children based their prospective judgments on the feedback, but did not adjust 
their predictions depending on task difficulty. This pattern would thus provide evidence in favor 
of the anchoring hypothesis. Because the feedback could not affect performance on the first 
memory task, statistical analyses were not carried out on the data recorded during that test. 
Finally, to explore the relationship between children’s vulnerability to anchoring effects 
and their vulnerability to feedback effects and, thus, to determine whether these effects share 
common processes, a Pearson’s correlation analysis was computed on the two susceptibility 
scores. Moreover, we also examined whether susceptibility to anchoring and feedback effects 
varied with the children’s age. To this end, Pearson’s correlation analyses were carried out 
between the two susceptibility scores and participants’ chronological age (in months). In the 
following sections, the significance level was set at .05.  
Preliminary analyses. Preliminary analyses indicated homogeneity of variance, and 
revealed no gender or order effect on any of the dependent variables. Moreover, to ensure that 
the anchoring manipulation introduced during the judgment phase of the first memory task had 
no delayed effect on the scores recorded during the second memory test, a 3 (Anchoring) x 2 
(Feedback) ANOVA was carried out on the memory, judgment, and calibration scores of the 
second memory task. No main effect or interaction was found on any of the dependent 
measures, Fs<1, ps>.45, indicating that providing an anchor during the first phase had no late 
effect on children’s performance. 
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Anchoring effect. 
Memory score. The results of the three-way ANOVAs conducted on the number of 
correct responses revealed a significant main effect of age, F(2,102) = 33.40, MSe = 2.59, p < 
.001, η²p = .43, indicating that older children had better memory performance than younger 
children. Furthermore, the number of correct responses also appeared to be higher for the easy 
task than for the hard task, F(1,102) = 84.94, MSe = 2.59, p < .001, η²p = .49. No other main 
effect or interaction reached significance, Fs<2, ps>.13. 
Judgment score. Replicating the results of Experiment 2, the ANOVA carried out on the 
judgment score revealed a main effect of anchoring condition, F(2,102) = 27.49, MSe = 6.05, p < 
.001, η²p = .37. Linear contrast analyses indicated that participants in the high anchor condition 
predicted that they would remember more targets (Mean = 7.83) than participants in the no 
anchor (mean = 5.05) condition, p < .001, and that participants in the low anchor (Mean = 3.64) 
predicted that they would remember fewer words than participants in the no anchor condition, 
p = .016. No other effect reached significance, Fs<2.56, ps>.08. 
Calibration score. As can be seen in Table 3, the results of the ANOVA conducted on 
calibration scores revealed a main effect of age, F(2,102) = 4.89, MSe = 0.04, p = .01, η²p = .10, 
indicating that older participants made more calibrated judgments than younger participants. A 
main effect of task difficulty was also found, F(1,102) = 22.17, MSe = 0.04, p < .001, η²p = .20. 
More specifically, children’s predictions for the easy task were more calibrated than their 
predictions for the hard task, which is consistent with the fact that memory performance was 
higher for the easy task than for the hard task while no differences were found between these 
two tasks for the judgment score. Moreover, a main effect of anchoring condition was also 
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found, F(2,102) = 22.54, MSe = 0.04, p < .001, η²p = .33. Linear contrast analyses revealed a 
significant difference between each of the three conditions (high, low, or no anchor), all ps < 
.02, with better prediction calibration in the low anchor condition than in the no anchor 
condition and a better calibration in the no anchor condition than in the high anchor condition. 
< Table 3 about here > 
Feedback effect. 
Memory score. The three-way ANCOVA demonstrated that participants recalled more 
targets for the easy than for the hard task, F(1,102) = 66.64, MSe = 2.49, p < .001, η²p = .41. A 
main effect of age was also found, F(2,102) = 3.64, MSe = 2.49, p = .03, η²p = .07: older children 
recalled more words than younger children. The effect of the covariate (memory score for the 
first task) was also significant, F(2,102) = 26.75, MSe = 2.49, p < .001, η²p = .22. No other main 
effect or interaction was found, all Fs<1.03, ps>.31. 
Judgment score. The influence of age group, feedback condition, and task difficulty on 
children’s global prospective judgment was examined. The results of the statistical analyses 
showed a main effect of age, F(2,95) = 10.29, MSe = 5.59, p < .001, η²p = .18: younger children 
made lower predictions than older children. The two older groups did not differ in terms of the 
number of items predicted, p = .37. As Figure 2 shows, a feedback x task difficulty interaction 
was also found, F(2,95) = 19.56, MSe = 5.59, p < .001, η²p = .17. In the feedback condition, 
higher predictions were made for the hard task (Mean = 6.74) than for the easy task (Mean = 
4.81), F(1,95) = 8.15, MSe = 5.59, p = .005. Conversely, in the no feedback condition, lower 
predictions were made for the hard task (Mean = 4.85) than for the easy task (Mean = 6.70), 
F(1,95) = 7.53, MSe = 5.59, p = .006. Moreover, children also made higher predictions for the 
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hard task in the feedback (6.74) than in the no feedback condition (4.85), F(1,95) = 7.84, MSe = 
5.59, p = .006, while they made lower predictions for the easy task in the feedback (4.81) than 
in the no feedback condition (6.70), F(1,95) = 7.83, MSe = 5.59, p = .006. These findings suggest 
that children in the feedback condition adjusted their predictions toward the feedback they 
were given, regardless of the difficulty of the task. On the contrary, children in the no feedback 
condition seemed to adjust their predictions depending on the task’s difficulty. An effect of the 
covariate (judgment score for the first task) was also found, F(2,102) = 27.60, MSe = 5.59, p < 
.001, η²p = .23. No other main effect or interaction reached significance, all Fs<1.66, ps>.19. 
< Figure 2 about here > 
Calibration score. The results revealed a trend toward a main effect of age, F(2,102) = 
2.84, MSe = 0.03, p = .06, η²p = .06, suggesting that older participants made more calibrated 
predictions than younger participants. We also found a main effect of task difficulty, F(1,102) = 
30.61, MSe = 0.03, p < .001, η²p = .24, indicating that children overestimated their performance 
for the hard task (Mean = .09) and underestimated their performance for the easy task (Mean = 
-.06). Moreover, a feedback x task difficulty interaction was found, F(1,102) = 12.52, MSe = 
0.03, p < .001, η²p = .12, (see Table 4). More specifically, children in the feedback condition 
underestimated their memory performance for the easy task (Mean = -.13) and overestimated 
their memory performance for the hard task (Mean = .14). Participants in the no feedback 
condition showed good calibration for both the easy (Mean = .01) and the hard (Mean = .04) 
task. In absolute terms, then, children in the feedback condition produced less calibrated 
responses than children in the no feedback condition, p = .002. Once again, an effect of the 
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covariate (judgment score for the first task) was found, F(2,102) = 12.11, MSe = 0.03, p < .001, 
η²p = .11. No other main effect or interaction reached significance, all Fs<1, ps>.89. 
< Table 4 about here > 
Correlation analyses. We investigated the relationship between children’s susceptibility 
to anchoring and feedback effects. Only participants in the high or low anchor conditions who 
also received feedback were included in the following correlation analyses (n = 36). A positive 
correlation was highlighted between children’s predisposition to adjust their prospective 
judgments on the basis of an anchor and their inclination to rely on feedback to make their 
memory predictions, r = .41, p = .01 (see Figure 3). 
Lastly, we examined the relationship between children’s susceptibility to anchoring and 
feedback effects and their chronological age. Neither of the two correlations was significant, 
suggesting that children’s sensitivity to external cues did not vary with age.  
< Figure 3 about here > 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 demonstrated that children in the feedback condition adjusted their 
prediction in the direction of the feedback provided, regardless of task difficulty. Specifically, 
participants generated a higher prospective judgment for the hard task (after receiving positive 
feedback for the easy task) than for the easy task (after receiving negative feedback for the 
hard task). On the other hand, children in the no feedback condition seemed to take into 
account the strength of the association between the items that composed each word pair in the 
memory task when making their decisions. These children produced lower judgments for the 
hard task than for the easy task. These findings are not consistent with the hypothesis that 
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providing feedback helps children to realize that they have not estimated their memory 
performance accurately, which in turn is supposed to prompt them to invest more efforts in 
monitoring the quality of their memories. Within this framework, children in the feedback 
condition would have been expected to adjust their memory predictions as a function of task 
difficulty. Indeed, many studies have demonstrated that children are able to detect differences 
in the strength of the association between the two items in a pair, and then use this 
information to guide their metacognitive judgments (e.g., Koriat et al., 2009a); this is confirmed 
by the pattern of results obtained in the no feedback condition. Children in that condition were 
shown to take the difficulty of the task into account when making their memory predictions. 
On the other hand, our results seem to be in line with the anchoring hypothesis. The 
fact that participants in the feedback condition adjusted their predictions in the direction of the 
feedback without considering the task’s difficulty is coherent with the hypothesis that the 
external information provided by the feedback was used as an anchor for judgment. Moreover, 
these findings are strengthened by the positive correlation found between the two scores 
computed to assess participants’ susceptibility to the anchoring and feedback effects. The latter 
result indicates that children who are more sensitive to the anchoring effect are also more 
sensitive to the feedback effect, suggesting that, in this experiment, both effects might be 
sustained by the same mechanisms and, thus, that feedback influences children’s judgments 
through automatic rather than effortful metacognitive processes. 
General Discussion 
This study was designed to achieve three main goals: (a) determine whether 
metacognitive feedback allows young children to better predict their memory performance; (b) 
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examine whether children rely on the Anchoring-and-Adjustment heuristic to guide their 
memory decisions; and (c) explore whether the feedback effect results from an anchoring 
effect. Three experiments were carried out for this purpose. Their results are discussed in 
relationship to each of our hypotheses in the following sections. 
Anchoring Effect 
The involvement of automatic inference rules in children’s decision processes has 
recently been demonstrated for various kinds of metacognitive heuristics (Geurten, Lloyd & 
Willems, 2016; Geurten, Meulemans, & Willems, 2015; Geurten, Willems, Germain, & 
Meulemans, 2015; Geurten, Willems, & Meulemans, 2015; Koriat et al., 2009a, 2009b). 
However, while some of these studies showed that heuristic-based inferences can already 
influence children’s decisions by the age of 4 (e.g., Geurten, Willems, & Meulemans, 2015), 
others did not detect any reliance on metacognitive heuristics before the age of 9 (e.g., Koriat 
et al., 2009a, 2009b). Moreover, despite its acknowledged influence on various numerical 
judgments, the Anchoring-and-Adjustment heuristic had never been studied in children under 
the age of 9 (Smith, 1999). Experiments 2 and 3 consistently indicated that all children – 
whatever their age – adjusted their memory predictions lower or higher as a function of the 
external anchor, demonstrating the involvement of the Anchoring-and-Adjustment heuristic in 
their decision-making. From a theoretical point of view, this finding is coherent with other 
studies that have recently established that the ability to implement automatic inference rules 
to regulate decision-making processes develops very early on, providing interesting information 
on the types of mechanisms that underlie young children’s decision-making.  
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Feedback Effect 
Three interesting findings about the effect of feedback on global prospective judgments 
were observed. Experiment 1 suggested that feedback helps even very young learners to 
correct their metacognitive judgments when it is a direct indicator of future memory 
performance. However, when feedback is not a relevant predictor of performance on a 
subsequent test (Experiment 3), we found no difference in the calibration of prospective 
judgments between the two feedback conditions. More specifically, the results of the third 
experiment indicated that participants who received feedback predicted that they would 
remember more items for the hard task than for the easy task, while participants who did not 
receive feedback demonstrated the reverse pattern. This leads to the counterintuitive finding 
that absolute prediction accuracy in the no feedback condition was higher than in the feedback 
condition. In addition, a positive relationship was highlighted between children’s susceptibility 
to the anchoring and feedback effects. 
As a whole, these results are in line with the anchoring hypothesis (Scheck & Nelson, 
2005) but not with the hypothesis that providing feedback draws children’s attention to the 
fact that they have over- or underestimated their performance, which in turn should cause 
them to invest more efforts in evaluating the quality of their internal processes. Indeed, in 
Experiment 3, if learners truly allocated more resources to evaluating which items they knew 
and which items they did not, differences in the number of strongly associated pairs in the two 
tasks should have been detected (Koriat et al., 2009a). However, our result can easily be 
explained within the framework of the Anchoring-and-Adjustment heuristic. As a reminder, the 
anchoring effect is assumed to occur because people incompletely adjust their judgment from 
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an anchor toward the value they would have given in the absence of such external information 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). If information provided by metacognitive feedback serves as an 
anchor for the participant’s memory predictions, it could explain why differences in task 
difficulty were not used to guide prospective judgment. When the easy task was administered 
first, children performed well, so they received positive feedback. Because they did not adjust 
their predictions away from this high value, they predicted that they would perform better on 
the hard task than the children who received no feedback did. Similarly, when the hard task 
was given first, children performed poorly, so they received negative feedback. Because they 
based their predictions for the easy task on this low anchor, they expected to remember fewer 
items than children in the no feedback condition. In other words, we postulate that the 
feedback provided for the first memory task had a lasting anchoring effect on children’s 
judgments for the second memory task and that this anchoring effect was so strong that 
participants overlooked the task’s difficulty when making subsequent judgments. The positive 
correlation between the two susceptibility scores further confirms this postulate since it 
indicates that children who were sensitive to the feedback effect were also sensitive to the 
anchoring effect. In other words, the participants who adjusted their predictions the most 
based on the anchor in the first task also adjusted their predictions the most based on the 
feedback during the second task. These results suggest that the same processes could be 
involved in anchoring-based and feedback-based judgments. Other studies examining the direct 
link between anchoring and feedback effect and the variables that sustain them should, of 
course, be carried out to corroborate our results. Moreover, several limitations should be noted 
for this research. First, multiple studies have shown that numerical understanding differs in 
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preschool years and in elementary school years (e.g., Dowker, 2008). This difference could have 
influenced how numerical judgments were made in our three age groups. Another limitation is 
the small number of subjects per cell. Indeed, a larger sample size could have possibly led to 
different interpretations of our effects. Nonetheless, our findings already provide interesting 
information on how numerical feedback can affect children’s metacognitive judgments. 
Theoretical and Practical Perspectives 
Theoretically, our findings are consistent with Koriat’s (2007) model, which assumed 
that people do not systematically base their metacognitive judgments on effortful monitoring 
processes. Rather, they frequently rely on automatic inference rules, such as the Anchoring-
and-Adjustment heuristic, to make quick decisions even though these heuristic-based decisions 
are prone to bias (Besken & Mulligan, 2013; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Interestingly, from a 
developmental point of view, our results showed that children in all age groups were inclined to 
use feedback as an anchor for their prospective judgments, suggesting that even older children 
with more cognitive resources still preferred to make their memory judgments on the basis of 
salient external information rather than to implement effortful monitoring processes. These 
results are strengthened by the finding that children’s susceptibility to anchoring and feedback 
effects does not vary with age. Overall, these results suggest that children prefer to base their 
metacognitive decisions on automatic inference and that providing feedback does not seem to 
induce them to engage in more effortful decision-making processes. 
Moreover, our results have practical implications. Feedback is usually considered to 
inform learners of what they know and what they do not know so that they will be able to 
efficiently regulate their future performance (for a review, see Kornell & Bjork, 2007). Based on 
Running head: Feedback effect in children 33 
this assumption, feedback is often given after learners have completed a task, particularly in 
educational settings. In our study, we found that even young children are able to use feedback 
to regulate their metacognitive decisions. However, receiving feedback does not always have a 
positive impact on children’s judgments. Specifically, when we varied the level of difficulty 
between the task on which the feedback was given and the task on which the feedback had to 
be used, we found that children who received metacognitive feedback demonstrated poorer 
calibration than children who did not. Thus, it seems that, in some cases, feedback can impair 
the calibration of children’s metacognitive judgment rather than improving it, suggesting that 
free rein should be given to young learners when they need to judge the quality of their 
memory. At the very least, the results of the present study indicate that feedback about the 
accuracy of metacognitive judgments should be used with caution. According to studies of 
feedback effects on cognitive performance, people do not react to all types of feedback in the 
same way (e.g., Allwood, Jonsson, & Granhag, 2005; Pashler, Cepeda, Wixted, & Rohrer, 2005). 
Considering the proven influence of metacognition on both cognitive and academic 
performance, future studies (e.g., using other types of metacognitive judgments and other 
types of feedback) should be conducted so we can better understand when and how children 
can take advantage of metacognitive feedback. 
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Appendix 
Lists of Stimuli Used in Experiment 3 
Easy list Hard list 
Collier – Bague (Necklace – Ring) Peigne – Cheveux (Comb – Hair) 
Hiver – Eté (Winter – Summer) Jour – Nuit (Day – Night) 
Ecole – Maîtresse (School – Teacher) Pomme – Banane (Apple – Banana) 
Fenêtre – Porte (Window – Door) Table – Chaise (Table – Chair) 
Fermier – Tracteur (Farmer – Tractor) Sel – Sucre (Salt – Sugar) 
Silence – Bruit (Silence – Noise) Chambre – Forêt (Room – Forest) 
Tigre – Lion (Tiger – Lion) Assiette – Crayon (Plate – Pencil) 
Boule – Glace (Scoop – Ice cream) Cochon – Plage (Pig – Beach) 
Roi – Reine (King – Queen) Ballon – Rêve (Balloon – Dream) 
Noir – Blanc (Black – White) Muguet – Papier (Lily of the valley – Paper) 
Lune – Jus (Moon – Juice) Guitare – Veste (Guitar – Jacket) 
Fantôme – Pelle (Ghost – Spade) Nuage – Clef (Cloud – Key) 
Feuille – Marmite (Leaf – Pot) Ciseaux – Lampe (Scissors – Lamp) 
Tambour – Caillou (Drum – Pebble) Eléphant – Gomme (Elephant – Eraser) 
Haricot – Poupée (Bean – Doll) Tête – Livre (Head – Book) 
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Table 1 
Mean Number of Items Recalled, Number of Items Predicted, and Prediction Calibration for the Two Memory Tasks, Each 
Experimental Condition (Feedback/No Feedback), and Each Age Group (4-, 6-, or 8-year-olds) in Experiment 1 
 Feedback (n = 24) No Feedback (n = 24) 
 4 years 6 years 8 years Total 4 years 6 years 8 years Total 
Recall (1) 1.88 (1.36) 3.62 (1.77) 4.00 (1.41) 3.17 (1.74) 2.12 (0.99) 3.75 (1.03) 4.00 (1.31) 3.29 (1.37) 
Recall (2) 1.50 (1.20) 3.25 (1.58) 3.75 (1.16) 2.83 (1.61) 1.37 (1.30) 2.13 (1.73) 3.50 (1.51) 2.33 (1.71) 
Prediction (1) 10.12 (4.82) 6.87 (3.36) 6.75 (2.25) 7.92 (3.82) 7.75 (5.26) 7.75 (2.49) 8.13 (2.47) 7.88 (3.49) 
Prediction (2) 6.87 (4.82) 4.87 (2.23) 5.87 (1.25) 5.88 (3.13) 7.5 (4.50) 8.25 (2.37) 8.12 (1.81) 7.96 (3.00) 
Calibration (1) 0.62 (0.35) 0.25 (0.27) 0.18 (0.13) 0.35 (0.32) 0.38 (0.37) 0.27 (0.15) 0.27 (0.19) 0.31 (0.25) 
Calibration (2) 0.36 (0.38) 0.12 (0.17) 0.14 (0.14) 0.21 (0.27) 0.41 (0.31) 0.41 (0.22) 0.31 (0.16) 0.38 (0.23) 
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Table 2 
Mean Number of Items Recalled, Number of Items Predicted, and Prediction Calibration for Each Experimental Condition (Low, High, 
or No Anchor) and Each Age Group (4-, 6-, or 8-year-olds) in Experiment 2 
 Low (n = 15) Ø (n = 15) High (n = 15) 
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Table 3 
Mean Number of Items Recalled, Number of Items Predicted, and Prediction Calibration for the First Memory Task as a Function of 
Experimental Condition (Low, High, or No Anchor) and Age Group (4-, 6-, or 8-year-olds) in Experiment 3 
 Low (n = 36) Ø (n=36) High (n = 36) 
 4 years 6 years 8 years Total 4 years 6 years 8 years Total 4 years 6 years 8 years Total 



















































































Mean Number of Items Recalled, Number of Items Predicted, and Prediction Calibration for the 
Two Memory Tasks, Each Experimental Condition (Feedback/No Feedback) and Each Age Group 
(4-, 6-, or 8-year-olds) as a Function of Task Difficulty (Easy/Hard) in Experiment 3 












Feedback 4 years 6.11 (0.60) 3.22 (0.83) 5.22 (3.42) 4.56 (2.13) –0.07 (0.26) 0.10 (0.14) 
6 years 8.00 (1.58) 5.11 (2.71) 5.44 (2.40) 7.44 (2.60) –0.20 (0.18) 0.18 (0.19) 
8 years 8.56 (1.88) 6.33 (1.94) 5.67 (2.35) 8.22 (3.31) –0.22 (0.19) 0.15 (0.17) 
Total 7.56 (1.76) 4.89 (2.31) 5.44 (2.67) 6.74 (3.07) -0.16 (0.22) 0.14 (0.17) 
No Feedback 4 years 4.67 (1.00) 2.89 (1.90) 4.00 (2.60) 3.22 (1.09) –0.05 (0.23) 0.03 (0.18) 
6 years 7.11 (0.78) 4.22 (1.64) 6.78 (3.15) 5.56 (2.51) –0.03 (0.26) 0.10 (0.25) 
8 years 9.11 (1.54) 5.78 (1.20) 7.11 (2.80) 5.78 (1.72) –0.15 (0.28) 0.00 (0.13) 
Total 6.96 (2.16) 4.30 (1.96) 5.96 (3.09) 4.85 (2.14) -0.07 (0.26) 0.04 (0.19) 












Feedback 4 years 3.56 (1.59) 5.67 (1.32) 5.33 (4.30) 3.22 (1.39) 0.14 (0.33) –0.19 (0.12) 
6 years 5.11 (1.62) 6.22 (1.48) 4.33 (1.87) 5.44 (2.46) –0.06 (0.15) –0.06 (0.18) 
8 years 5.33 (2.18) 7.67 (2.45) 5.33 (2.18) 5.78 (1.30) 0.00 (0.25) –0.15 (0.13) 
Total 4.67 (1.92) 6.52 (1.95) 5.00 (2.91) 4.81 (2.08) 0.02 (0.26) -0.13 (0.15) 
No Feedback 4 years 2.11 (2.08) 5.22 (0.97) 5.21 (3.96) 5.78 (2.95) 0.24 (0.27) 0.04 (0.22) 
6 years 4.89 (1.69) 6.56 (1.33) 4.89 (3.22) 6.78 (3.11) 0.00 (0.21) 0.02 (0.27) 
8 years 5.44 (1.42) 8.00 (2.65) 6.78 (3.23) 7.56 (3.61) 0.10 (0.30) –0.03 (0.17) 








Figure 1. Details of procedures for each of the three experiments. 
Figure 2. Number of items predicted for the second memory task as a function of task difficulty 
(easy vs. hard) and experimental condition (feedback vs. no feedback) in Experiment 3. Error bars 
show the standard deviation of the mean. 
Figure 3. Scatterplot for children’s susceptibility to the anchoring effect as a function of their level 
of susceptibility to the feedback effect in Experiment 3. The Pearson’s correlation is still 
significant when the three outliers are removed (r = .34 instead of .41). 
 
 
